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Abstract: The exact cause of the massive defaults and foreclosures in the U.S. subprime mortgage market 
is still unclear. This paper investigates whether a particular aspect of borrowers’ financial literacy—their 
numerical ability—may have played a role. We measure several aspects of financial literacy and cognitive 
ability in a survey of subprime mortgage borrowers who took out mortgages in 2006 or 2007 and match 
these measures to objective data on mortgage characteristics and repayment performance. We find a large 
and statistically significant negative correlation between numerical ability and various measures of 
delinquency and default. Foreclosure starts are approximately two-thirds lower in the group with the 
highest measured level of numerical ability compared with the group with the lowest measured level. The 
result is robust to controlling for a broad set of sociodemographic variables and not driven by other 
aspects of cognitive ability or the characteristics of the mortgage contracts. Our results raise the 
possibility that limitations in certain aspects of financial literacy played an important role in the subprime 
mortgage crisis. 
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The expansion of credit in the early-to-mid 2000s has had a profound impact on real estate
and ﬁnancial markets. In a very short time, it has broadened homeownership, particularly
among individuals that had traditionally been shut out of credit markets. This growth
occurred despite lagging income growth in these groups over the same time, and also in areas
in which little house price growth could be expected (Mian and Suﬁ, 2009a). Moreover, on
top of broadening homeownership rates, the expansion of credit has also led to a substantial
increase in borrowing by previous homeowners taking advantage of quickly rising home
prices over the same period of time: Evidence suggests that they borrowed as much as 30
cents for every dollar increase in the value of their homes (Mian and Suﬁ, 2009b).
Improved access to credit as such oﬀers the beneﬁts of consumption smoothing over time.
The standard model in economics assumes that agents are rational and fully understand
their environment. In such a model, making more credit available will unambiguously
increase welfare, and so from that perspective the expansion of credit was viewed by many
as welfare-enhancing. However, as house prices leveled oﬀ in 2006 and began to decline,
this was accompanied by a massive increase in late payments on subprime mortgages, and
an explosion of outright defaults (e.g. Foote et al., 2008b; Mayer et al., 2009). This led
to a sharp drop in the value of mortgage-backed securities and to the worst ﬁnancial and
macroeconomic crisis since the Great Depression.
In light of these dramatic developments, a debate has started over how to explain the
increase in late mortgage payments and defaults, which precipitated the broad economic and
ﬁnancial crisis. Several papers discuss the role of credit supply changes, and in particular
the potential role of relaxed underwriting standards in generating an expansion of mortgage
credit (e.g., Gerardi et al., 2009; Mian and Suﬁ, 2009a; Nadauld and Sherlund, 2009). By
contrast, this paper examines the borrower side. Many market observers, including Akerlof
and Shiller (2009), believe that departures from full rationality are an important factor
in explaining the decline of the subprime mortgage market and the subsequent foreclosure
2crisis. In part, “irrational exuberance” (Shiller, 2005) — the belief that house prices will
just keep rising — may have played a role. But Akerlof and Shiller (2009) and others (e.g.,
Boeri and Guiso, 2007) argue that individuals’ limited ability to make complicated ﬁnancial
decisions contributed importantly to the sharp rise in mortgage defaults.
Our paper is the ﬁrst, to our knowledge, to directly examine this hypothesis. We combine
micro data on subprime mortgage terms and their entire stream of payments with survey
data from a telephone interview with a sample of subprime borrowers. A key feature of this
survey is a set of questions measuring several aspects of ﬁnancial literacy, notably numeri-
cal ability and economic literacy, in our respondents. Earlier studies have shown that these
aspects of ﬁnancial literacy are poor in large parts of the population (Lusardi and Mitchell,
2009; Banks and Oldﬁeld, 2007; Lusardi and Tufano, 2008; McArdle et al., 2010) and that
individuals make systematic mistakes, such as underestimating interest rates from payment
streams (Stango and Zinman, 2008). Of even greater concern however, is that diﬀerences
in ﬁnancial literacy are correlated with consumption and savings decisions. A low ability
to perform simple mathematical calculations, for example, is correlated with lower levels
of saving (Banks and Oldﬁeld, 2007; McArdle et al., 2010), less planning for retirement
(Lusardi and Mitchell, 2009), poorer comprehension of credit, and the feeling that spending
is out of control (Lusardi and Tufano, 2008).1 Indirect evidence also points to the possibility
that cognitive limitations play an important role in the choice of a mortgage instrument.
Evidence from micro data on mortgages shows that individuals are confused about impor-
tant contract terms of their mortgage (Bucks and Pence, 2008), and that individuals who
were rated as confused by the interviewer were more likely to have adjustable-rate mort-
gages (Bergstresser and Beshears, 2009). Agarwal et al. (2010a) show that participants
in a voluntary ﬁnancial education program are less likely to fall behind on their mortgage
1Bernheim et al. (2001) present evidence that increases in mandatory schooling have positive eﬀects
on ﬁnancial market participation. Mandatory increases in schooling on this scale have been shown not to
have any eﬀect on college graduation rates (Lochner and Moretti, 2004). The result is thus suggestive that
basic education increases understanding of ﬁnancial decision making. By contrast, Cole and Shastry (2007),
using mandatory introduction of ﬁnancial literacy education ﬁnd little evidence that they have much eﬀect
on their measure of ﬁnancial market participation.
3payments, potentially indicating that increased ﬁnancial literacy leads to lower delinquency
rates (see also Agarwal et al. (2010b) for the eﬀect of mandatory counseling on mortgage
market outcomes). In addition, micro evidence on mortgage delinquency shows a pattern
of ﬁnancial struggle: Many consumers fall behind, then become current again, only for the
cycle to repeat itself again and again. By contrast, fewer borrowers show an abrupt stoppage
of payments that would be indicative of strategic default (Foote et al., 2009).
We explicitly test for the role of ﬁnancial literacy and cognitive limitations in the rise of
subprime mortgage delinquencies and defaults, and present robust evidence of a correlation
between a speciﬁc aspect of ﬁnancial literacy, numerical ability, and mortgage delinquency.
We conducted a survey in the summer of 2008 on a sample of subprime borrowers in the
states of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island who obtained mortgages in 2006
and 2007. We measured aspects of their ﬁnancial literacy (numerical ability and economic
literacy) and cognitive ability using methods that are standard in the literature (Banks and
Oldﬁeld, 2007; Dohmen et al., 2009; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2009). Our sample of subprime
mortgage borrowers is taken from a dataset on privately securitized subprime mortgages
that the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston purchased from First American LoanPerformance.
This data set contains detailed information on mortgage terms and complete payment his-
tory streams as reported by the mortgage servicers, which allows us to track the sample
over time and follow their subsequent mortgage outcomes. We ﬁnd a large and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant negative correlation between ﬁnancial literacy and measures of mortgage
delinquency and default, and the ﬁnding is robust to the inclusion of controls for income,
education, risk aversion, and time preferences, thus ruling out a broad set of potential bi-
ases from omitted variables. The point estimates are remarkably robust, and quantitatively
important: 20 percent of the borrowers in the bottom quartile of our ﬁnancial literacy in-
dex have experienced foreclosure, compared to only 5 percent of those in the top quartile.
Furthermore, borrowers in the bottom quartile of the index are behind on their mortgage
payments 25 percent of the time, while those in the top quartile are behind approximately
410 percent of the time.
We include as control variables measures of other aspects of ﬁnancial literacy and a
general measure of cognitive ability, but ﬁnd that the correlation is highly speciﬁc to one
aspect of ﬁnancial literacy: numerical ability. We devote the remainder of the paper to
determining the underlying cause of this correlation. There are of course two possibilities.
First, there could be a causal eﬀect of numerical ability on mortgage repayment behavior.
For example, individuals who cannot perform the simple mathematical calculations that are
necessary to maintain a household budget or to calculate whether or not monthly mortgage
payments are aﬀordable over a long horizon may be more likely to miss mortgage payments
over time. This interpretation is consonant with the picture that emerges from the survey
evidence linking poor ﬁnancial literacy to higher consumption, less saving, and out-of-control
credit usage (Banks and Oldﬁeld, 2007; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2009; Lusardi and Tufano,
2008). However, because this is a survey and we are not able to randomize through a
controlled experiment there is always the possibility of omitted variable bias – a diﬀerent
factor may be causally responsible for the variation in mortgage repayment behavior in our
data, and also correlated with our measure of ﬁnancial literacy. We take this possibility very
seriously in our empirical work, and our rich dataset allows us to narrow down the channels
through which numerical ability could be associated with mortgage default. In addition to
ruling out the inﬂuence of socio-demographic variables (including income), other cognitive
skills, and preference parameters, we also ﬁnd no evidence that the link between ﬁnancial
literacy and delinquency is mediated by diﬀering contract terms or bigger mortgages for a
given home value. Thus, individuals with poor numerical ability do not appear to make
systematically diﬀerent choices with respect to their mortgage terms. We also do not ﬁnd
that the link is related to diﬀerences in experience with mortgages. While we cannot rule
out all other possible explanations, the robustness of our empirical estimates leads us to
conclude that limited numerical ability played a non-trivial role in the subprime mortgage
crisis. Our result also oﬀers new ways to further test this relationship and points to the
5importance of addressing limited ﬁnancial literacy in the post-crisis reformation of mortgage
markets.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section II details the empirical
setup and provides an overview of the data. Section III discusses our empirical methodology.
Section IV presents the results. Section V discusses some caveats of our study, and concludes
the paper.
II. Design of Study
In this section we provide a detailed discussion of our sample and survey design. First, we
describe the pool of mortgage borrowers that we chose to draw our survey sample from, and
discuss potential sample selection biases. Then, we discuss the survey procedure and the
diﬀerent parts of our survey in detail.
A. The Sample
In order to obtain objective measures of mortgage delinquency and default, we construct
our survey sample from data that combines two micro-level mortgage datasets. The ﬁrst is
a loan-level dataset constructed and maintained by FirstAmerican LoanPerformance (LP).
LP collects information on individual mortgages that are used as collateral for non-agency,
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and sold to investors on the secondary mortgage market.
We use LP data that the Boston Fed purchased in mid-2007. This dataset covers Mas-
sachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island from the late-1990s through March 2009. The
LP dataset contains extensive loan-level information on mortgage characteristics, including
interest rates (initial levels and changes over time), documentation levels, payment histo-
ries, loan-to-value ratios, and various other lending terms. It also contains some information
regarding borrower characteristics, such as the borrower’s credit score and debt-to-income
ratio at origination (borrower’s monthly debt payment divided by his or her monthly in-
6come). Finally, the LP dataset identiﬁes the type of MBS each loan was packaged into —
subprime, Alt-A, or prime.2
The second dataset we use was supplied by The Warren Group, a private Boston ﬁrm
that has been tracking real estate transactions in New England for more than a century.
The Warren Group collects publicly available real estate transaction records that are ﬁled
at Registry of Deeds oﬃces throughout New England, and have maintained an electronic
database of these records for the past twenty years. The data that we use includes the
universe of purchase-money mortgages, reﬁnance mortgages, home equity loans, home equity
lines of credit (only information on capacities and no information on utilization rates), and
purchase deeds (including foreclosure deeds) transacted in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and
Rhode Island. Unlike the LP data, this data contains the precise location of each property
and the exact names of the buyers and sellers of each property as well as the names of the
mortgage borrowers. These data allow us to construct a history of mortgage transactions for
a household in a given property. In other words, with the Warren Data we are able to follow
households in the same house across diﬀerent mortgages. Since the data include information
on all mortgage liens and the sale price for each property, we are able to construct a precise
measure of the cumulative loan-to-value ratio at the time of purchase,3 and to keep track
of the total number of mortgages obtained by each homeowner.
We matched data from LP to data from the Warren Group, and only used the sample of
ﬁrst-lien mortgages contained in subprime MBS from the LP dataset that were originated
in 2006 and 2007. The match is based on the zip code of the property (LP contains only the
identity of the zip code where the property is located), the date of mortgage origination,
the amount of the mortgage, whether the mortgage was for purchase or reﬁnance, and the
identity of the institution that originated the mortgage. The match rate was approximately
2The sample of prime loans in the LP dataset consists of mortgages with values above the GSE (Gov-
ernment Sponsored Enterprise) conforming loan limits. This segment of the prime market is often referred
to as jumbo-prime.
3The LP data has only sporadic information on the presence of second liens, and thus does not allow
for the construction of accurate cumulative loan-to-value ratios.
745 percent, and left us with a sample of more than 74,000 mortgages.4
We randomly selected mortgages from this matched dataset to construct our sample of
borrowers for the survey. To contact borrowers we used two diﬀerent strategies: 1) Cold-calls
involved calling borrowers by phone. This was possible as we know each borrower’s name and
address from the Warren dataset, and used this information in an internet search engine
(USAPeopleSearch.com) to ﬁnd each borrower’s phone number(s). 2) Mail-ins involved
mailing invitations to participate in the survey to the addresses listed in the Warren data.
[Table 1 about here.]
Table 1 displays response rates for these two strategies. For the Cold-call strategy, we
called a total of 3,523 borrowers5 in the summer of 2008 (June - August). We were unable
to reach a working phone line for approximately one-third (1,043) of these calls, while for a
little more than one-third (1,366), we were able reach a working line, but unable to verify
that the phone number corresponded to the borrower in the data.6 Finally, we were able
to positively identify the borrower in slightly less than one-third of the cases. In half of
those cases (559) we were unable to speak to the actual borrower, and thus never received
a response to our interview request.7 In 296 cases we reached the borrower, but he or she
refused to participate in the survey,8 and in 259 cases we reached the borrower and he or she
agreed to participate in the survey. Based on these statistics, we report two participation
4The main issue that contributed to the low match rate was the inconsistent deﬁnition of dates between
the two datesets. The date listed in LP is the date of origination, while the date listed in the Warren data
is the date that the mortgage document was recorded. It usually takes at least a few days for documents to
be ﬁled in the Registry of Deeds oﬃces (sometimes a few weeks), and thus, these two dates do not match.
Therefore, we were forced to use a date range in our matching algorithm, and consequently often found
cases of multiple mortgages of the same amount, originated in the same zip code, in a given date range. We
were forced to throw out these cases of multiple matches. The identity of the originating institution often
helped us in these cases, but unfortunately the LP data contain only sparse information on this variable.
5We often found multiple possible phone numbers for each borrower in the data, so the actual number
of phone numbers that we called was much larger than the number of borrowers.
6This included cases in which nobody picked up the phone and cases in which we reached an answering
machine and left a message, but received no response (and could not identify the borrowerfrom the answering
machine message).
7In most of these cases we either left a message on an answering machine and never heard back, or spoke
to another member of the household, but were not able to reach the actual borrower.
8We include cases in which the borrower agreed to participate at a later date, but never followed through
on that agreement.
8rates for the Cold-calls in the ﬁrst column of Table 1. Of the borrowers that we actually
spoke to directly, 46.6 percent agreed to participate in the survey, while 10.4 percent of the
borrowers for whom we were able to verify a correct phone number agreed to participate.
We mailed almost 5,000 invitation letters to borrowers for whom we could not ﬁnd
phone contact information (Mail-ins). The invitation letter was one page (two-sided) and
contained a brief description of the survey and the survey conductors. We also included a
small response card that contained a question asking if the borrower would be interested
in participating in the survey, and space for the borrowers who agreed to participate to list
working phone numbers and times of the day that were best to contact them. We included
a response envelope and postage. In the vast majority of cases (97.5 percent), we never
received a response. When we did receive a response, we attempted to call the borrower to
conduct the interview. Of the borrowers that we were able to reach (93), approximately 97
percent agreed to participate in the survey (74 percent of the borrowers for whom we could
verify a correct address).
[Table 2 about here.]
Sample selection bias is always a serious concern in surveys such as this one. As we
have information about observable mortgage and borrower characteristics for all of the bor-
rowers we contacted, we can test whether there is sample selection on those observable
characteristics. Table 2 contains detailed information on the presence of sample selection in
observable mortgage and borrower characteristics. The table compares average character-
istics between the respondents and non-respondents for both the Cold-Calls sample (Panel
A) and the Mail-In sample (Panel B). There is no evidence of sample selection in the phone
call sample. The diﬀerence in averages for all variables is never statistically signiﬁcant at
even the 10 percent level. Furthermore, there is very little evidence of sample selection in
the mailing sample. The only diﬀerence that is statistically signiﬁcant (at the 10 percent
level) is the average mortgage size. Importantly, there is no diﬀerence in the probability of
foreclosure after the mailing went out between respondents and non-respondents. We also
9perform a more rigorous test of potential sample selection bias on observables. For each
outcome measure k in Table 2, we estimate
y
k
i = αk + γkRi + βkCCi + ǫ
k
i (1)
where αk is the constant for outcome k, γk is the diﬀerence in the outcome if the individual
was a respondent (and Ri = 1), and βk is the diﬀerence in the outcome if individual i was
a cold call (and CCi = 1). Finally, ǫk
i is the residual for outcome k. We estimate the
k equations in (1) by seemingly unrelated variables, thus allowing the residuals ǫk
i to be
correlated across outcomes within individuals. We then test the hypothesis γk = 0 for all k
outcome measures. The p-value of the corresponding χ2-test is p = 0.52, and thus we ﬁnd
no evidence of selectivity into the survey on these 10 important variables.
While it does not appear that selection into the survey sample is an issue, the timing
of the survey raises some important issues. The survey was conducted in the summer of
2008 between June and August, while the borrowers chosen for the survey obtained their
mortgages in 2006 and 2007. August 2007 is the last month that a mortgage was originated in
the survey sample, quite simply because the subprime mortgage market had completely shut
down at that point and no new mortgages were originated. This means that the subprime
borrowers taking the survey had been paying their respective mortgages for at least 10
months and up to 32 months (for mortgages originated in January 2006). In addition, one
of the requirements that we imposed for inclusion into the sample was that each borrower
not be in the foreclosure process at the time that the survey was conducted. Because of this
design feature, the results in this study are not necessarily representative of all subprime
mortgage borrowers. Many subprime borrowers defaulted on their loans and experienced
foreclosure within the ﬁrst year of origination. The average number of months to default for
all subprime mortgages originated in 2006 and 2007 in the LP dataset for which the servicer
has initiated foreclosure proceedings is slightly less than 18. More than one-quarter of the
defaults occurred within one year of origination. As we will discuss in more detail below,
10the eﬀects of numerical ability on delinquency and default in this analysis are likely to be
lower bounds, as the composition of mortgages in our sample potentially means that the
least sophisticated subprime mortgage borrowers defaulted before we conducted the survey,
and thus did not make it into our sample.
B. The Survey
The survey contained four important parts: 1) Measures of two aspects of individuals’
ﬁnancial literacy, numerical ability and basic economic literacy, and a measure of general
cognitive ability. 2) Measures of time and risk preferences. 3) Questions about the details of
the mortgage contract (we already know much of this information from the micro datasets)
and the experience of shopping for the mortgage. 4) An extensive list of socio-demographic
characteristics that complements information from the LP dataset.
On average, the survey took about 20 minutes to complete, and individuals were com-
pensated $20 for their participation.
B.1. Financial Literacy: Numerical Ability and Cognitive Ability
The ﬁrst measure of ﬁnancial literacy, and the one that we primarily focus on in this study,
determines the proﬁciency of a respondent in solving basic mathematical calculations. We
asked participants ﬁve questions developed by Banks and Oldﬁeld (2007). The questions
are as follows:
1. In a sale, a shop is selling all items at half price. Before the sale, a sofa costs $300.
How much will it cost in the sale?
2. If the chance of getting a disease is 10 per cent, how many people out of 1,000 would
be expected to get the disease?
3. A second hand car dealer is selling a car for $6,000. This is two-thirds of what it cost
new. How much did the car cost new?
114. If 5 people all have the winning numbers in the lottery and the prize is $2 million, how
much will each of them get?
5. Let’s say you have $200 in a savings account. The account earns ten per cent interest
per year. How much will you have in the account at the end of two years?
To construct an index of numerical ability, Banks and Oldﬁeld (2007) suggest dividing indi-
viduals into four separate groups based on the responses to the ﬁve questions. A borrower
is placed into the ﬁrst group corresponding to the lowest level of numerical ability if he
answers questions 1, 2, and 3 incorrectly or answers question 1 correctly, but gets questions
2, 3, and 4 incorrect. The second group is made up of borrowers who answer at least one
of the ﬁrst four questions incorrectly (the outcome of the ﬁfth question is not considered
for this group). The third group contains borrowers who answered questions 1, 2, 3, and
4 correctly, but answered question 5 incorrectly. Finally, borrowers who answered all ﬁve
questions correctly are placed into the fourth group. Table 3 shows the distribution of the
numerical ability index in our sample as well as the distribution from Banks and Oldﬁeld.
Approximately 16 percent of borrowers fall into the lowest group, 54 percent into the second
group, 17 percent into the third group, and 13 percent into the highest group. Despite being
characterized by a very diﬀerent group of individuals, the distribution of the index in the
Banks and Oldﬁeld study is very similar the distribution of our sample.
[Table 3 about here.]
In order to distinguish numerical ability from general cognitive ability, we use a verbal
ﬂuency measure that was introduced by Lang et al. (2005). Participants are asked: “ In
the next 90 seconds, name as many animals as you can think of. The time starts now.”
The number of animals named has been shown to be highly correlated with IQ (e.g. Lang
et al., 2005). The reason for this is that intelligence is highly correlated with the ability to
retrieve known information. As most people know hundreds, if not thousands of animals,
the question reveals how easy it is to retrieve information. Obviously, the ability to name
12animals in English also depends on individuals’ English language skills, which we elicit
separately (see below). In the economics literature, Dohmen et al. (2009) also use this
question to measure cognitive ability. Figure 1 compares the distribution of responses in
our survey to their study, which used a representative sample of the German population.
The shape of the distributions is very similar.
[Figure 1 about here.]
In addition to our measure of ﬁnancial literacy that focuses on respondents’ numerical
ability, we measure respondents’ basic understanding of economic mechanisms using two
questions from Lusardi and Mitchell (2009). Lusardi and Mitchell (2009) refer to these
as ”basic ﬁnancial literacy” questions, but in our opinion they measure an individual’s
understanding of basic economic concepts, and thus we refer to them as questions about
“economic literacy.”
1. Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inﬂation
was 2% per year. After 1 year, how much would you be able to buy with the money in
this account? More than today, exactly the same as today, or less than today?
2. Suppose that in the year 2020, your income has doubled and prices of all goods have
doubled too. In 2020, how much will you be able to buy with your income? More than
today, exactly the same as today, or less than today?
In our sample, approximately 79 percent of borrowers answered the ﬁrst question correctly,
and 74 percent answered the second question correctly, while 60 percent answer both ques-
tions correctly. These results are very similar to those obtained by Lusardi and Mitchell
(2009).
As a further measure of cognitive ability, we also include the mean time it took the
participants to respond to the Banks and Oldﬁeld (2007) questions. We measure the time
from the moment the surveyor has ﬁnished reading the question to the moment the person
13gives the answer. Table 5 displays the correlations between all the measures of cognitive
ability. There is a strong positive correlation between all measures of cogntive ability. Thus,
individuals who score well in one measure of cognitive ability also score better in the others.
There is also a strong and negative correlation of every measure of cognitive ability with
the response time in the numerical ability questions. Thus, individuals who responded more
quickly to these questions also had a higher score in them, and in all the other measures of
cognitive abilities.9
A factor analysis reveals one common factor between the ﬁve variables. Only the ﬁrst
eigenvalue is greater than one, while all others are almost exactly equal to zero. Finding
one common component to diﬀerent measures of intelligence is quite common, and found in
many other studies (See, e.g., Flynn, 2007; Burks et al., 2009a).
B.2. Time and Risk Preferences
In order to measure time and risk preferences, we asked individuals in the survey to make a
number of hypothetical choices that allowed us to calculate their discount factors and risk
aversion parameters.
Similar to experimental measures of time preferences (see, e.g., Meier and Sprenger, 2010,
2009), individuals decide on an amount that makes them indiﬀerent between receiving a
certain monetary amount now versus waiting x months for a larger monetary amount. This
procedure allows us to calculate an individual’s discount factor. We asked individuals to
make such intertemporal trade-oﬀs either for now versus x = 6 months or x = 12 months.
The two time frames also allow us to construct a measure of whether individuals have
dynamically inconsistent time preferences (e.g., Laibson, 1997). In our sample, the average
discount factor is 0.97 (over one month) and 81 percent of our sample exhibit dynamically
9A skeptic may argue that diﬀerences in our measure of cognitive abilities rather pick up styles in which
individuals answer questions. Some may take the time to think about the question and then answer, while
others may have just blurted out the ﬁrst thing that came to their mind. The negative correlation between
response times and the measures of cognitive ability also goes against this interpretation, as it shows that
individuals who struggled to answer, also were more likely to get the answer wrong.
14consistent time preferences, similar to Meier and Sprenger (2010). In addition, we also asked
the borrowers to assess their impatience on a 11-point scale from 0 corresponding to “very
impatient” to 10 corresponding to “very patient.” In our empirical work we mainly use the
measure of impatience that is based on the set of hypothetical choices, but the results do
not change if we instead us the subjective scale.
Our measure of risk aversion also followed standard experimental strategies (e.g., Barsky
et al., 1997). We asked participants to hypothetically choose between a certain payoﬀ and
a 50-50 chance of receiving a good or a bad payoﬀ:
Which would you prefer: A mortgage for which you paid 1000 dollars per month for the
next thirty years, or a mortgage, in which, after two years the payment is either $500 or
$1100 with equal chance?
If the participant accepted the uncertain lottery, we raised the high mortgage payment
of the uncertain mortgage by increments of $100. We use the payoﬀ at which the partici-
pant switches to the safe mortgage as our measure of risk tolerance. The mean switching
amount was $ 1184, revealing a substantial degree of risk aversion. In addition, we asked
participants to assess their level of risk tolerance on a scale from 0 to 10 as in Dohmen et
al. (2005). As with the self-assessed impatience measure, the second risk measure does not
require any numerical skills. Nevertheless, in our empirical analysis we primarily use the
risk measure based on the set of hypothetical choices (most related to experimental risk
measures), although the results are robust to using the self-reported scale measure.
B.3. Mortgage Details and Mortgage Experience
The survey contains numerous questions about the characteristics of the mortgage con-
tracts including questions about the size of the mortgage, initial interest rate, whether the
mortgage is an adjustable-rate or ﬁxed-rate instrument, whether the mortgage was for the
purchase of the home or a reﬁnance of a previous loan, and the existence of a prepayment
penalty. These questions complement the mortgage information from the combined Loan-
15Perfomance and Warren dataset, which includes the credit score of the borrower, the initial
cumulative loan-to-value ratio, the extent of the documentation provided to the lender, and
the monthly debt-to-income ratio of the borrower (including other forms of debt).
We obtain information on previous experience in mortgage markets from the Warren
dataset. We are able to calculate the number of mortgages obtained since the house pur-
chase (going back to January 1987), which allows us to calculate the number of mortgages
taken out by each household before the current one.10 We supplement this information
with additional proxies for borrowers’ experience with mortgages and their search behavior
prior to obtaining the mortgage. The survey asks participants whether they were ﬁrst-time
homebuyers, whether they had taken a home buying class or had received counseling, if
they obtained information about mortgage pricing before obtaining their loan, and if they
had, how they obtained the information (internet, relative, friend, etc.).
B.4. Socio-demographics
Finally, the survey contains detailed questions about socio-demographic characteristics and
information about household income and employment status. We asked participants about
their race and ethnicity, gender, age, place of birth, amount of time spent in the United
States, marital status, number of children, education level, and proﬁciency with the English
language (scale from 0 corresponding to a “beginner” to 10 corresponding to a “native
speaker”). We included questions on the amount of household income, the number of family
members that contribute to household income, and the volatility of household income (on a
three-point scale with 1 signifying that “it’s been pretty stable”; 2 signifying “it has gone up
and down a little over the last few years”; and 3 indicating that “it has gone up and down a
lot over the last few years”). Finally, we asked participants about their current employment
status and the number of times that they had been out of work over the previous ﬁve years.
Table 4 displays sample means and standard deviations of the survey variables for each of
10We only see mortgage information for the current property, and do not have any information on previous
residences.
16the four numerical ability groups. The patterns for each variable across the diﬀerent groups
accord well with intuition. Proﬁciency with the English language, the percent of households
born in the United States, cognitive ability, and household income is monotonically increas-
ing in the level of numerical ability as measured by the four groups. In contrast, income
volatility, the percentage of black and hispanic households, the percentage of households
with a high school diploma or less, the level of the initial contract interest rate, and the
percentage of low documentation mortgages is monotonically decreasing in the level of nu-
merical ability. The pattern for the two variables that summarize a household’s experience
in mortgage markets is very interesting. The percentage of ﬁrst-time homebuyers is mono-
tonically decreasing in the level of numerical ability, as 70 percent of households in the lowest
numerical ability group are ﬁrst-time homebuyers, while only 33 percent of households in the
highest group are ﬁrst-time homebuyers. This pattern suggests that the least experienced
households with respect to buying a home are also the least ﬁnancially sophisticated. But,
the average number of previous mortgages obtained by a household is also monotonically
decreasing in the level of numerical ability. This implies that, on average, households with
the most experience with mortgages are the most numerically challenged. This seems to
contradict the relationship between numerical ability and being a ﬁrst-time homeowner, but
these two observations can be reconciled by noting that a much lower percentage of mort-
gage originations were for the purchase of a home for the lower numerical ability groups as
compared with the higher numerical ability groups. In addition, the lower numerical ability
groups are characterized by a disproportionate number of households that have frequently
reﬁnanced. We conjecture that this is a result of a greater amount of cash-out reﬁnancing
activity on the part of households characterized by lower numerical ability.
There are a few other interesting patterns that are worth mentioning in table 4. Average
credit scores (as measured by FICO) are much higher for the most numerically able group
of borrowers as compared to the three lower groups, but there is very little diﬀerence in
average credit scores across groups 1, 2, and 3. The correlation between numerical ability
17and higher education appears puzzling in the table, but that reﬂects the manner in which
we constructed the education groups. We constructed the groups to be mutually exclusive,
so for example a household that obtained an undergraduate college degree as well as a
professional degree would be given a value of 1 in the “Higher degree” group, but a value
of 0 in the “College” group (even though that household also obtained an undergraduate
college degree). This is the reason for the signiﬁcant decrease in the “College” variable
percentage when moving from the second most numerically able group of households to
the most numerically able group. The highest group is characterized by a large percentage
of households that obtained a graduate degree (about 40 percent), and by only a small
percentage of households that obtained an undergraduate college degree without a graduate
degree (25 percent).
[Table 4 about here.]
C. Measures of Mortgage Delinquency
We use three diﬀerent measures of mortgage delinquency in the empirical analysis. First,
we construct a variable that measures the fraction of time a borrower is behind on at least
one of his mortgage payments. This measures the time during which a household is unable
or unwilling to meet the promised mortgage payments. Imagine a household misses only
one payment, and makes all the future payments in time. This ﬁrst measure counts him as
behind in each period until he makes that payment.
The second measure of mortgage delinquency is the fraction of mortgage payments
missed. This variable is an explicit measure of the extent of delinquency. For example,
a borrower who has had a mortgage for 12 months and who has missed 6 payments would
be assigned a value of 50 percent for this measure, while a borrower who has had the mort-
gage for the same amount of time, but who has only missed 3 payments, would be assigned
a value of 25 percent.
Our third measure is a dichotomous variable that takes a value of one if foreclosure
18proceedings have been initiated by the lender. Normally, foreclosure proceedings are initi-
ated when a borrower is 120 days delinquent on his or her mortgage (or equivalently is 4
payments behind).11
[Table 6 about here.]
Table 6 contains information on the distributions of the three delinquency measures in
our sample. The average borrower in our sample is behind on this payments 20 percent of
the time, and has missed 11 percent of his or her mortgage payments. Half of the borrowers
in our sample are delinquent more than 7 percent of the time and have missed more than
5 percent of their mortgage payments, while 10 percent of the borrowers are delinquent
more than 60 percent of the time and have missed more than 30 percent of their payments.
Almost 20 percent of the borrowers in our sample have been in the state of foreclosure at
some point in their mortgage experience.
III. Empirical Speciﬁcation
Our main empirical speciﬁcation takes the following form:
Di = γNAi + xi
′β + ǫi (2)
where Di corresponds to the ﬁrst two measures of delinquency discussed above, the percent
of time spent in delinquency and the percent of mortgage payments missed, for household
i. The term NAi represents the numerical ability group of household i, xi represents a
vector of control variables, and ǫi is the residual. We estimate the equation by ordinary
least squares (OLS)12, accounting for possible heteroskedasticity in the standard errors. For
11One of the participation criteria was not being in foreclosure at the time of the survey. But, there are a
few instances in which a borrower had been in foreclosure in the period before the survey was administered,
but then had recovered by the time of the survey. These borrowers were included in the survey sample.
12The results are robust to using tobit regressions instead of OLS (see Table A1 in the appendix).
19our third measure of delinquency, the initiation of foreclosure proceedings, we estimate a
probit model,
Pr[Fi = 1|NAi,xi] = Φ(γNAi + xi
′β) (3)
where Fi takes the value of one if foreclosure proceedings have been initiated on the borrower
and zero otherwise, and Φ() is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal
distribution.
We focus on numerical ability as the independent variable of interest in an initial step,
because the strongest evidence from the previous literature comes from studies linking nu-
merical ability to savings (Banks and Oldﬁeld, 2007). In a later step, we then include other
measures of ﬁnancial literacy that are not directly related to the ability to perform math-
ematical calculations, but more to the ability to understand ﬁnancial concepts, as well as
controls for general cognitive ability (Dohmen et al., 2009; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2009).
We include control variables xi to avoid two types of omitted variable biases: there may
be some other variable x that has a causal impact on defaults and on numerical ability,
but due to the omission of x, that eﬀect is captured by numerical ability. Secondly, it is
also possible that numerical ability does not have a direct eﬀect on delinquency, but rather
causes x, which in turn aﬀects delinquency and default propensities. In this case, omitting
x would lead to the improper conclusion that numerical ability aﬀects delinquency directly,
while it really is a determinant of some other variable that in turn aﬀects delinquency. We
will not be able to distinguish between these two types of biases, but including controls
helps us narrow down the admissible set of interpretations of our result.
In choosing the appropriate set of controls, we use guidance from the literature on models
of mortgage default. Economic models of mortgage default emphasize the role of liquidity
shocks and diﬀerences in household ﬁnancial situations that make borrowers diﬀerentially
vulnerable to those shocks (Gerardi et al., 2009; Pennington-Cross and Ho, 2010; Sherlund,
2008; Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2010). If the shocks or exposure to the shocks are
20correlated with, or caused by, numerical ability, then they may act as omitted variables and
thus, would need to be taken into account. For example, numerical ability may aﬀect the
ﬁnancial situation of the household in general, thus putting them at a disadvantage from
the beginning of the mortgage. But in order to understand the contribution of numerical
ability on the decisions made during the mortgage tenure, we need to control for initial
diﬀerences in ﬁnancial situations.
Models of mortgage default also predict that preference parameters, such as time pref-
erences and risk preferences should be related to default (Foote et al., 2009). For example,
more impatient individuals may be more likely to default on a mortgage, all else being
equal. Furthermore, a recent literature suggests that these preference parameters may be
correlated with certain aspects of cognitive abilities (Burks et al., 2009b; Benjamin et al.,
2006; Dohmen et al., 2009). Thus, including measures of time preference and risk preference
parameters allows us to examine the impact of numerical ability on delinquency separate
from a potential correlation with those preference parameters.
The empirical mortgage literature also documents large diﬀerences across borrowers in
the extent of delinquency and default that are due to diﬀerences in mortgage characteristics
and house price movements. Gerardi et al. (2009), Foote et al. (2008b), Mayer et al. (2009)
and Foote et al. (2009) show that there are large diﬀerences in default rates between ﬁxed-
rate and adjustable-rate mortgages, and that local house price movements are strongly
correlated with default rates. However, from a theoretical view, the type of mortgage,
or the location of a house are among the most important choices of any home purchase.
Therefore, these diﬀerences should be regarded as diﬀerences in choices of the individuals.
To the extent that these are correlated with numerical ability, diﬀerences in these choices
may plausibly be a consequence of limitations in numerical ability. It is therefore not clear




Figure 2 displays the relationship between the numerical ability index and our three mea-
sures of delinquency. There are three bar graphs corresponding to each of the three delin-
quency measures. There is a monotonically decreasing relationship between the percent of
time delinquent and numerical ability (Panel A). Borrowers in the lowest numerical ability
group on average spend almost 25 percent of the time in delinquency, while those in the
highest group spend on average only 12 percent of the time in delinquency. In Panel B
we also see a similar relationship between the percent of missed mortgage payments and
numerical ability. The lowest group has missed almost 15 percent of mortgage payments on
average, while the highest group has missed only 6 percent of payments on average. Fore-
closure also appears to be negatively related to numerical ability (Panel C). While there is
a small diﬀerence in the percentage of foreclosure between the ﬁrst and second numerical
ability group, the third group is characterized by a signiﬁcantly lower percentage of foreclo-
sures than the ﬁrst two groups (15 percent versus more than 20 percent), while the fourth
and highest group is characterized by a signiﬁcantly lower percentage of foreclosures than
the third group (7 percent versus 15 percent).
Table 7 displays the coeﬃcient estimates from the linear regressions (columns (1) and
(4)) and the estimated marginal eﬀects from the probit model of foreclosure starts (column
(7)). They indicate that, as suggested by the ﬁgure, the correlations between numerical
ability and the delinquency measures are positive and statistically signiﬁcant. As the ﬁgure
already suggested, magnitudes are also quantitatively important: A borrower in the lowest
category of the numerical ability index spends, on average, approximately 15 percent more
time in delinquency than a borrower in the highest category. The diﬀerences in foreclosure
rates across numerical ability groups are also very large. According to the estimates, the
diﬀerence in foreclosure rates between the bottom quartile and top quartile is approximately
2218 percentage points. To put this number in perspective, it is similar to the diﬀerence in
foreclosure rates in the subprime mortgage sector when house prices were rapidly rising in
2005 (roughly 5 percent) compared to when they were rapidly falling in 2007 (roughly 20
percent, see Foote et al. (2009)).13
[Figure 2 and Table 7 about here.]
While quantitatively important, there are many possible interpretations of the estimated
correlation between numerical ability and mortgage delinquency. There could be a causal
eﬀect of numerical ability on mortgage repayment behavior. The inability to perform simple
mathematical calculations is likely to negatively impact a borrower’s ability to manage a
household budget. In addition, such an inability may adversely aﬀect the borrower’s ability
to choose the appropriate type of mortgage given his or her current ﬁnancial status and
expected future ﬁnancial situation. Both of these scenarios would likely put a borrower at
risk of falling behind on his or her mortgage.
Alternatively, the correlation could be the result of omitted variables that are related
to certain socio-economic characteristics of the borrowers. For example, poor numerical
ability in the form of poor numerical ability could lead to less success in the labor market,
which in turn could adversely impact income levels that could result in a higher incidence of
mortgage delinquency and default. Lower numerical ability may also simply be correlated
with lower levels of education, with other aspects of education other than numerical ability
contributing to the higher delinquency levels.14 An emerging literature also documents that
preferences are correlated with cognitive ability (Burks et al., 2009a; Dohmen et al., 2009;
Benjamin et al., 2006), so it is possible that diﬀerences in preferences could account for the
correlation between numerical ability and mortgage delinquency. Finally, there could be
13The extent of delinquency and foreclosure is also estimated to be monotonically increasing in numerical
ability when we employ a speciﬁcation that includes a separate dichotomous variable for each numerical
ability group (see Table A2 in the Appendix).
14For example, in Burks et al. (2009a), smoking and cognitive abilities are highly correlated in a univariate
regression. But once one controls for education, cognitive abilities are no longer signiﬁcant.
23omitted variables related to the borrower’s ﬁnancial situation at the time of mortgage orig-
ination that might lead to delinquency at some later date and happen to be also correlated
with our measure of numerical ability. For example, individuals with poor numerical ability
may be more burdened with debt before they obtain their mortgage.
In the remainder of the paper, we use the richness of our survey dataset and mortgage
datasets to try to distinguish between these alternative explanations in order to determine
the channel through which numerical ability aﬀects mortgage repayment behavior.
B. Socio-economic Characteristics, Preferences, and Household Fi-
nancial Status
In columns (2), (5) and (8) of Table 7, we include the socio-economic variables and preference
parameters that we collected in the survey to the regressions as control variables. They
include variables for age, gender, ethnicity, education, the size of the household, time and
risk preference parameters, labor market status over the previous ﬁve years, the household’s
income, and the subjective measure of income volatility. As can be seen in the ﬁrst row
of Table 7, the inclusion of these control variables does not signiﬁcantly alter the point
estimates or the standard errors associated with our numerical ability index. Numerical
ability remains signiﬁcantly correlated with mortgage delinquency, and the point estimates
remain large and virtually unchanged. The control set, however, does contain important
predictors of delinquency, as can be seen in the increase in the R2 from roughly 2 to 14
percent. In particular, variables related to labor market success, such as income and income
stability, as well as the number of times out of work over the previous ﬁve years, have a
signiﬁcant impact on delinquency.
In columns (3), (6) and (9), we also include controls for certain aspects of the house-
hold’s ﬁnancial situation at the time of origination. We include the FICO score, and dummy
variables for whether the borrower is an investor (owner occupant as the reference group),
as well as whether the mortgage is for a “purchase” (“reﬁnance” as the reference group).
24Again, the coeﬃcient estimates are unaﬀected, and remain statistically signiﬁcant in all
speciﬁcations. The inclusion of these controls also signiﬁcantly increases the R2 of the
regression from around 15 percent to approximately 25 percent. The FICO score, in partic-
ular, is an important determinant of delinquency and default. The fact that the correlation
between numerical ability and delinquency does not change when we include the FICO score
at origination is an important ﬁnding.15 It implies that our measure of numerical ability is
not just capturing the fact that borrowers who have defaulted on previous debts are more
likely to default on their mortgage compared to borrowers with good credit histories.16
C. Diﬀerent Measures of Financial Literacy and Cognitive Ability
The next step in our analysis is to pin down the particular aspect of ﬁnancial literacy that
aﬀects mortgage repayment behavior. In addition to the education variable, we include
as control variables an additional aspect of ﬁnancial literacy and a measure of cognitive
ability that is unrelated to ﬁnancial literacy. Our measure of cognitive ability is a verbal
IQ measure that is related to information processing, while our second measure of ﬁnancial
literacy includes two questions taken from Lusardi and Mitchell (2009) that are meant to
measure basic economic literacy. We also include the response times to the numerical ability
questions as an explanatory variable. Table 8 displays the results. In columns (1), (3) and
(5), we include only the verbal IQ measure. The inclusion of the verbal IQ measure does not
aﬀect the magnitude or statistical signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcient associated with
ﬁnancial literacy. The verbal IQ measure, conditional on our numerical ability measure,
is not correlated with the ﬁrst two measures of delinquency (percent of time behind, and
percent of payments behind). However, it does enter signiﬁcantly into the probit model
for foreclosure. An increase of one standard deviation in the verbal IQ measure (8 points),
15Notice also that the inclusion of the FICO score renders most labor market controls that were signiﬁcant
in columns (2), (5), and (8), insigniﬁcant, with the exception of the volatility of income. Since the FICO
score is constructed to be a catch-all predictor for delinquency, this is not entirely surprising.
16The estimated correlation between numerical ability and delinquency is not aﬀected by the inclusion
of debt-to-income ratios at origination, which capture other types of debt in addition to mortgage debt (see
the discussion below and Table 9).
25is associated with a 4.8 percentage point decrease in the foreclosure rate. An important
diﬀerence between foreclosure and the other two delinquency measures is that foreclosure
is initiated by the lender. One possible interpretation of this ﬁnding is that lenders may be
less likely to foreclose on an intelligent person who is behind, and that this is picked up by
our measure of IQ.
Columns (2), (4) and (6) display the results when we also include the measures of eco-
nomic literacy and the response times in the set of control variables. They are not correlated
with any of the three measures of delinquency, and do not aﬀect the point estimate of our
numerical ability measure. These ﬁndings lead us to conclude that the correlation between
ﬁnancial literacy and mortgage repayment behavior is speciﬁc to borrowers’ numerical abil-
ity. The addition of both a verbal IQ measure, the response time and a diﬀerent aspect of
ﬁnancial literacy, economic proﬁciency, does not explain diﬀerences in mortgage delinquency
and default, and does not aﬀect the the correlation between our numerical ability index and
mortgage delinquency.
[Table 8 about here.]
D. Mortgage Terms and Prior Experience in Mortgage Markets
An important potential channel through which ﬁnancial literacy could aﬀect mortgage delin-
quency is in leading individuals to obtain mortgages with unfavorable terms, because they
may be more likely to make mistakes in assessing the ﬁnancial consequences of a particular
contract. To examine this possibility, we add two sets of control variables to our basic spec-
iﬁcation. The ﬁrst set controls for the contract terms of the mortgage, such as whether the
mortgage has a ﬁxed interest rate, and the initial interest rate of the mortgage. In a second
step we also include choice variables with respect to the size of the mortgage. We include
the loan-to-value ratio (LTV), and the debt-to-income ratio (DTI) to examine whether in-
dividuals with poor numerical ability take out loans that are signiﬁcantly larger than those
with higher literacy levels, and whether this causes their repayment problems.
26Table 9 displays the results. Columns (1), (3) and (5) display the results when we
control for diﬀerences in contract terms. The control variables do not add to the explanatory
power of our baseline speciﬁcation and, consequently, leave the point estimate of the impact
of numerical ability and its standard error, essentially unchanged. In columns (2), (4)
and (6), we also include LTV and DTI as control variables. The two variables have no
impact on delinquency or foreclosure. Again, the inclusion of the variables does not aﬀect
the magnitude or statistical signiﬁcance of the correlation between numerical ability and
delinquency. LTV is statistically signiﬁcant in the probit model of foreclosures. According
to the estimates, a 10 percentage point increase in LTV at origination is associated with a 5.3
percentage point increase in the probability of foreclosure. There are likely two explanations
for this ﬁnding. First, all else equal, a higher LTV at origination, implies a worse equity
position at each future date, and thus a higher probability of foreclosure (see for example
(Foote et al., 2008a)). Second, there is likely a selection eﬀect, whereby borrowers that are
more likely to default, perhaps because they have less wealth, choose to produce lower down
payments at the time of purchase.
[Table 9 about here.]
As a next step, we ask whether borrowers with poor numerical ability are less experienced
with mortgages, which may have an independent eﬀect on delinquency.17 We add as a
control variable the number of previous mortgages obtained by the borrower (from the
Warren dataset). In addition we include an indicator for ﬁrst-time homebuyers, as well as
a number of variables collected in the survey pertaining to the amount of information the
individual collected before signing the mortgage contract. Table 10 displays the results.
The correlation between numerical ability and delinquency is not aﬀected. Experience per
se does not seem to have a strong eﬀect on delinquency. There is, however, some evidence
that individuals who purchased a house for the ﬁrst time are more likely to experience
17Agarwal et al. (2008) show that people are learning to avoid making mistakes in the credit card market.
27foreclosure, though this eﬀect is diﬃcult to interpret.18
[Table 10 about here.]
E. Geographic Area and Mortgage Lenders
We explore two additional channels through which numerical ability could indirectly aﬀect
mortgage repayment behavior. The ﬁrst is related to the decline in house prices. Declining
house prices play an important role in explaining the rise in foreclosures during the recent
housing crisis (e.g., Foote et al., 2008b,a; Gerardi et al., 2007). Individuals with poor
numerical ability may have been less prudent in choosing the location of their property
because they may not have fully understood the ﬁnancial ramiﬁcations of declining house
prices for reﬁnancing. Thus, the correlation between numerical ability and delinquency
may be modulated by a poor choice of location. We address this issue by including a full
set of town/city ﬁxed eﬀects into our speciﬁcations. The results are displayed in columns
(1), (4) and (7) of Table 11 for each of our measures of delinquency, respectively. The
inclusion leads to a large increase in the R2, conﬁrming that regional variation is important
in explaining variation in mortgage delinquency, as found in many other studies (Foote et
al., 2008b,a; Gerardi et al., 2007). However, with 175 town ﬁxed eﬀects, the large increase
reﬂects the fact that in many towns, we observe few borrowers. Yet, most importantly, the
correlation between numerical ability and delinquency remains signiﬁcant, and for all three
measures, the point estimate increases. Thus, numerical ability does not appear to operate
on delinquency through poor choice of location.19
[Table 11 about here.]
18It may also be that individuals who have purchased a house before have more assets, as they beneﬁtted
from increasing house prices. Since this is not the focus of the paper, we do not explore this topic in further
detail.
19We also estimated a speciﬁcation in which we included the cumulative amount of house price appreci-
ation experienced between the time the mortgage was originated and the time the survey was conducted.
This controls for some of the cross-sectional dispersion in house prices that had developed over the course
of the ﬁnancial crisis. The results are robust to such a speciﬁcation.
28We also explore the possibility that individuals with poor numerical ability may choose
mortgage companies that provide poor support for mortgage borrowers. For example,
lenders and (and servicers to the extent that they diﬀer from the lender) may diﬀer in
how diligent they are about reminding borrowers when payments are due. Such diﬀerences
may explain variation in delinquency. Thus, in the remaining columns of Table 11, we add
originator (42) and servicer (27) ﬁxed eﬀects to our baseline speciﬁcation. The additional
controls increase the R2, but again leave the coeﬃcient estimate associated with numerical
ability unchanged.
V. Interpretation and Conclusion
This paper investigates whether subprime borrowers with limited ﬁnancial literacy are more
likely to be delinquent on their mortgage and more likely to default. We conducted an
extensive survey to measure subprime borrowers’ ﬁnancial literacy and cognitive ability
in the summer of 2008 and matched the individual-level measures to micro-level datasets
that contain extensive information on mortgage characteristics and payment histories. Our
estimation results show a signiﬁcant and quantitatively large association between one aspect
of ﬁnancial literacy, numerical ability, and mortgage delinquency. In addition, we ﬁnd that
foreclosure starts are two-thirds lower in the highest numerical ability group compared to
the lowest group. The correlation is robust to several measures of delinquency and to the
inclusion of a wide set of socio-economic and demographic control variables. The correlation
appears to be speciﬁc to numerical ability and is not driven by general cognitive skills
or economic literacy. Our results therefore show that limitations in numerical ability are
common and that there is a strong and quantitatively important link to subprime mortgage
defaults.
The results suggest that the correlation between mortgage delinquency and ﬁnancial
literacy is not due to ﬁnancially illiterate borrowers taking on too much debt, or choosing
29excessively risky mortgages. We are able to control for many details of the mortgage con-
tracts, but ﬁnd that the correlation is not sensitive to their inclusion in the econometric
models. This suggests that limited numerical ability might lead to other mistakes over the
course of time, like too much spending, too little savings, or inappropriate reaction to income
and/or consumption shocks. Such an interpretation is consistent with results using the same
measure of numerical ability for savings (Banks and Oldﬁeld, 2007), and related measures
(Stango and Zinman, 2008; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2009; Lusardi and Tufano, 2008). This
result also suggests that subprime mortgage borrowers with limited numerical ability were
no more likely than others to have been steered into unfavorable contract terms, although
there is an important caveat: We surveyed individuals between 1 and 2 years after their
mortgages had been originated, and many subprime mortgage defaults (about 60 percent,
see, e.g. Foote et al., 2009) happen within two years of origination. Thus, our results do not
completely rule out the possibility that limitations in ﬁnancial literacy led to unfavorable
mortgage terms or contracts that contribute to unfavorable mortgage outcomes.
We believe that our results also have several implications for future research and ap-
plications. First, the results show that a normally unobservable characteristic/ability can
explain part of the heterogeneity in default behavior. This ﬁnding provides insights to
lending ﬁrms on designing contract terms and default reduction strategies. Individuals who
have diﬃculties dealing with numbers seem to be riskier, controlling for usual indicators like
FICO scores. In order to better assess the risk of its customers, ﬁnancial institutions may
therefore have an interest in applying tests of numerical ability to screen loan applicants.
Second, one could ask whether the role of ﬁnancial literacy was particularly important
in this environment of rapidly falling house prices. Even among academic economists, the
views sharply diverged. Many economists thought that the rise in house prices reﬂected
fundamentals (e.g., Himmelberg et al., 2005), while others saw it as a giant bubble (e.g.,
Shiller, 2005). Thus, many individuals may have assumed that house prices would keep
rising at the previous high rates into the foreseeable future, and thus, may have relied
30more heavily on the accumulation of future equity in their homes to reﬁnance into a larger
mortgage, or to add a second lien to extract the equity. As the prospects for reﬁnancing
darkened, individuals with high ﬁnancial literacy may have found it easier to adjust their
consumption and savings decisions in order to continue making their mortgage payments.
Exploring this hypothesis more fully requires data from an episode in which house prices
were rising, and our data does not allow us to examine this in more detail.
Finally, our results suggest as a policy implication that more intensive ﬁnancial educa-
tion could substantially improve ﬁnancial decisions later in life, and, in fact, have a profound
impact on ﬁnancial markets as suggested by the evidence in Agarwal et al. (2010a) and Bern-
heim and Garrett (2003). But it is important to remember that while our data show a strong
and robust correlation that is highly speciﬁc and robust to a wide set of controls, it is not
a setting in which ﬁnancial literacy has been explicitly randomized in some way. The next
logical, but ambitious step, is to randomize ﬁnancial education and then track the ﬁnancial
decisions of these individuals over time.
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7Table 1
Response Rate for Diﬀerent Contact Strategies
Cold-calls Mail-Ins
Dead phone # or address 1,043 3
Unknown identity (not reached) 1,366 4,871
Known identity (not reached) 559 29




of working phone #s 10.4 % –
of individuals answering phone 46.6 % 96.7 %
Notes: Dead means that none of the phone numbers were work-
ing or mail got “returned to sender”. Unknown means that a
phone was ringing, but the subject could not be identiﬁed (or no
response to the mailing). Known means that the phone number
did belong to the target subject, but could never be reached
in person. Refused means that the subject was reached, but
refused to participate. Responded means that the subject was
reached and participated in the survey.
38Table 2
Comparing Characteristics of Responders and Non-Responders
# of Obs Means t-test of Diﬀerences
NR R NR R NR-R p-value
Panel A: Cold-Calls
FICO Score 2,346 242 632.3 638.7 -6.4 0.116
Fixed-Rate Mortage (=1) 2,346 242 0.410 0.397 0.014 0.678
Interest-Only (=1) 2,346 242 0.082 0.095 -0.013 0.479
Balloon Payment (=1) 2,346 242 0.203 0.227 -0.024 0.372
Reﬁnance (=1) 2,346 242 0.529 0.492 0.037 0.275
Loan-to-Value Ratio 2,346 242 78.264 77.706 0.559 0.520
Amount of Mortgage 2,346 242 237,215 250,294 -13,079 0.124
Initial interest rate 2,346 242 8.003 7.938 0.065 0.408
Debt-to-Income Ratio 2,153 227 41.666 41.348 0.318 0.619
Full-Doc Status (=1) 2,346 242 0.725 0.723 0.002 0.949
Foreclosure after 2,017 217 0.105 0.092 0.013 0.553
mailing went out (=1)
Panel B: Mail-Ins
FICO Score 4,902 90 621.3 612.9 8.4 0.173
Fixed-Rate Mortage (=1) 4,902 90 0.161 0.178 -0.017 0.659
Interest-Only (=1) 4,902 90 0.079 0.056 0.023 0.421
Balloon Payment (=1) 4,902 90 0.303 0.344 -0.042 0.394
Reﬁnance (=1) 4,902 90 0.781 0.778 0.003 0.943
Loan-to-Value Ratio 4,902 90 81.200 80.530 0.670 0.556
Amount of Mortgage 4,902 90 257,982 235,381 22,601 0.080
Initial interest rate 4,902 90 8.201 8.000 0.200 0.103
Debt-to-Income Ratio 4,537 86 42.226 43.756 -1.530 0.116
Full-Doc Status (=1) 4,902 90 0.653 0.600 0.053 0.294
Foreclosure after 3,779 76 0.160 0.145 0.015 0.718
mailing went out (=1)
Notes: Table shows number of observations, mean of various mortgage and borrower characteristics
of responders (R) and non-responders (NR). To test whether the diﬀerence of the various means
is statistically signiﬁcant between R and NR (NR-R), the table shows p-values of t-tests. The
information about Debt-to-Income Ratio is missing for a few observations in the Warren data set.
To compare Foreclosure after mailing went out we focus on individuals who were never in foreclosure
between the origination and the date we contacted them. For some of the borrowers who were
“current” on their mortgage when we contacted them (one criteria for being in the sample), a
foreclosure petition had been ﬁled before and they may have already been in the process of moving
out.
39Table 3
Distribution of Numerical Ability Index
Numerical Ability Group
1 2 3 4
This study: 15.6% 53.9% 17.1% 13.3%
Banks and Oldﬁeld (2007): 16.2% 46.6% 26.8% 11.1%
40Table 4
Summary Statistics by Numerical Ability Group
Numerical Ability Group Numerical Ability Group
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
English Fluency 9.30 9.78 9.81 9.98 Risk tolerance 1157 1171 1202 1256
(1.87) (0.92) (0.66) (0.15) (119) (146) (168) (208)
Income Volatility 1.98 1.87 1.84 1.80 Discount Factor 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.97
(0.77) (0.81) (0.77) (0.79) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Born in U.S. (dv) 0.74 0.84 0.86 0.91 Present Bias (dv) 0.19 0.21 0.14 0.24
# Years spent in U.S. 43.5 43.1 41.1 45.2 Duration of mortgage 28.4 28.6 29.4 28.3
(15.8) (14.0) (11.8) (12.6) (4.2) (4.9) (5.0) (4.7)
Asian (dv) 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 # Months already in home 50.7 52.6 38.1 35.8
(57.9) (61.3) (58.6) (55.4)
Black (dv) 0.32 0.20 0.14 0.07 2007 cohort (dv) 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.20
Hispanic (dv) 0.17 0.06 0.05 0.04 Owner non-occupant (dv) 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04
Native American (dv) 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.07 Cognitive ability score 17.5 21.5 26.9 27.1
(7.9) (8.2) (8.6) (7.6)
Other race (dv) 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 Fixed-rate loan (dv) 0.36 0.31 0.38 0.38
High school or less (dv) 0.49 0.29 0.10 0.04 Initial interest rate 8.2 8.0 7.9 7.8
(1.1) (1.1) (1.1) (1.2)
Some college (dv) 0.34 0.36 0.28 0.31 Low documentation (dv) 1.40 1.33 1.22 1.22
College (dv) 0.11 0.25 0.52 0.24 Cumulative LTV 0.86 0.83 0.85 0.85
(0.17) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17)
Higher degree (dv) 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.40 Back-end DTI ratio 43.1 42.5 39.9 41.3
(6.8) (8.1) (9.3) (8.6)
Employment status (dv) 0.75 0.86 0.84 0.87 # Previous mortgages 2.1 1.9 1.5 1.3
(2.6) (2.2) (2.2) (2.0)
Age of borrower 50 46 44 47 First-time Homebuyer (dv) 0.70 0.58 0.50 0.33
(10) (11) (8) (10)
# Children 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.8 Home counseling (dv) 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.09
(1.5) (1.5) (1.3) (1.4)
Credit score (FICO) 625 632 624 650 Shop around (dv) 0.47 0.56 0.76 0.71
(49) (62) (59) (72)
Purchase mortgage (dv) 0.40 0.39 0.53 0.62 Income ($ thousands) 51.6 69.4 100.6 127.1
(29.9) (33.3) (63.3) (98.9)
Notes: Table shows means of variables for the four numerical ability groups. Standard deviations in parentheses.
41Table 5
Correlation Between Measures of Cognitive Ability
Numerical Verbal IQ Savings Inﬂation
ability group measure scenario scenario
Verbal IQ 0.356 1
measure (0.000)
Savings scenario 0.236 0.153 1
correct (DV) (0.000) (0.005)
Inﬂation scenario 0.273 0.251 0.093 1
correct (DV) (0.000) (0.000) (0.087)
Reaction time in -0.279 -0.303 -0.157 -0.207
numerical ability (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
questions
Notes: N = 339. p-values in parentheses. A factor analysis
performed on these correlations reveals one common factor (λ =
1.17), while all other eigenvalues are less than 0.005.
Table 6
Distribution of Delinquency Measures
Percentiles
Mean Std. Dev. 10 25 50 75 90
Fraction of periods during 0.198 0.247 0 0 0.077 0.367 0.621
which household is behind on
at least one payment
Fraction of missed payments 0.110 0.143 0 0 0.056 0.167 0.304
Foreclosure 0.192 . . . . . .
Notes: N = 339 observations.
42Table 7: The Baseline Result
Fraction of Time in Delinquency Fraction of Payments Missed Foreclosure Initiated (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Numerical Ability Index – 0.043*** – 0.039** – 0.052*** – 0.024*** – 0.024** – 0.031*** – 0.059** – 0.065** – 0.082***
(0.014) (0.020) (0.019) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.026) (0.030) (0.028)
Fluency in English 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.013 0.014
(0.016) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.028) (0.026)
Born in USA (DV) – 0.034 – 0.053 – 0.020 – 0.027 – 0.115 – 0.108
(0.070) (0.076) (0.042) (0.043) (0.162) (0.155)
Years lived in US 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Asian (DV) – 0.158** – 0.275*** – 0.103** – 0.163***
(0.075) (0.082) (0.047) (0.048)
African American (DV) 0.109** 0.095** 0.070** 0.062** 0.153** 0.120*
(0.043) (0.039) (0.029) (0.026) (0.071) (0.067)
Hispanic (DV) 0.013 0.025 0.017 0.021 0.018 0.006
(0.057) (0.055) (0.029) (0.027) (0.101) (0.089)
Native American (DV) – 0.054 – 0.032 – 0.032 – 0.024 0.026 0.010
(0.110) (0.102) (0.053) (0.040) (0.179) (0.181)
Other Ethnicity (DV) 0.111 0.101 0.084 0.079 0.166 0.172
(0.131) (0.099) (0.089) (0.076) (0.232) (0.235)
Age – 0.003 – 0.003 – 0.001 – 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Some High School (DV) – 0.112 – 0.078 – 0.047 – 0.029 – 0.029 0.012
(0.096) (0.100) (0.055) (0.055) (0.155) (0.167)
High School Degree (DV) – 0.081 – 0.069 – 0.028 – 0.021 0.069 0.101
(0.071) (0.073) (0.046) (0.047) (0.175) (0.176)
Some College (DV) – 0.032 – 0.007 – 0.002 0.012 0.204 0.243
(0.070) (0.073) (0.045) (0.046) (0.177) (0.175)
College Degree (DV) 0.019 0.039 0.017 0.029 0.211 0.249
(0.073) (0.075) (0.046) (0.046) (0.192) (0.193)
Professional Degree (DV) 0.014 0.047 0.009 0.029 0.292 0.384
(0.075) (0.076) (0.047) (0.047) (0.231) (0.244)
Number of Children 0.009 0.003 0.003 – 0.000 0.024 0.021
(0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.014)
Male (DV) 0.017 0.050 0.016 0.033* 0.116** 0.147***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.018) (0.017) (0.048) (0.045)
Estimated δ – 0.665 – 0.261 – 0.455 – 0.257 – 1.116 – 0.556
4
3Table 7: (continued)
Fraction of Time in Delinquency Fraction of Payments Missed Foreclosure Initiated (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(0.732) (0.701) (0.424) (0.403) (1.117) (1.003)
Present-Biased (DV) 0.023 0.010 0.015 0.010 – 0.033 – 0.051
(0.037) (0.036) (0.020) (0.019) (0.061) (0.060)
Risk preference 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log household income – 0.054** – 0.026 – 0.023 – 0.008 – 0.071 – 0.044
(0.025) (0.025) (0.015) (0.015) (0.043) (0.040)
Volatility of HH Income 0.040** 0.042** 0.025** 0.026*** 0.056* 0.052**
(0.018) (0.016) (0.010) (0.009) (0.029) (0.026)
Number of times out of 0.017** 0.009 0.006 0.002 – 0.020 – 0.026*
work in last ﬁve years (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.014)
Employed (DV) – 0.006 – 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.034 0.044
(0.046) (0.044) (0.026) (0.025) (0.056) (0.045)
FICO Score / 10 – 0.015*** – 0.008*** – 0.020***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Home Purchase (DV) – 0.030 – 0.006 0.058
(0.035) (0.019) (0.061)
Months since home purchased – 0.000 – 0.000* – 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Originated in 2007 (DV) – 0.050 – 0.021 – 0.044
(0.034) (0.019) (0.043)
Investor (DV) – 0.012 – 0.004 – 0.007
(0.060) (0.034) (0.099)
Constant 0.296*** 0.838 1.351* 0.164*** 0.467 0.782*
(0.037) (0.762) (0.703) (0.023) (0.428) (0.402)
R2 0.023 0.148 0.260 0.022 0.138 0.245
F-test of H0: All coeﬃcients p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
are equal to zero
N 339 322 322 339 322 322 339 318 318
Notes: Robust standard errors in columns (1) - (6). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively. Regression coeﬃcients are reported in columns (1)
- (6). Marginal eﬀects from probit model are reported in columns (7) - (9).
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4Table 8
Controlling for General Cognitive Skills and Economic Literacy
Fraction of Time Fraction of Payments Foreclosure Initiated (=1)
in Delinquency Missed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Numerical Ability Index – 0.047** – 0.051*** – 0.031*** – 0.033*** – 0.065** – 0.061**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.011) (0.011) (0.027) (0.028)
Verbal IQ measure – 0.001 – 0.002 0.000 0.000 – 0.006** – 0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Savings Scenario 0.002 – 0.000 – 0.051
correct (DV) (0.036) (0.021) (0.058)
Inﬂation scenario 0.006 0.011 – 0.016
correct (DV) (0.033) (0.018) (0.047)
Reaction time – 0.003 – 0.000 – 0.001
in NA questions (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Control variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.262 0.268 0.242 0.244
F-test of H0: All coeﬃcients p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
are equal to zero.
N 322 322 322 322 318 318
Notes: Regression coeﬃcients are reported in columns (1) - (4). Marginal eﬀects from probit models are reported
in columns (5) - (6). Robust standard errors in parentheses in columns (1) - (4). All speciﬁcations contain the
full set of control variables as in Table 7.
Level of signiﬁcance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
4
5Table 9
Controlling for Mortgage Attributes
Fraction of Time Fraction of Payments Foreclosure Initiated (=1)
in Delinquency Missed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Numerical Ability Index – 0.048** – 0.039* – 0.030*** – 0.029** – 0.078*** – 0.064**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.011) (0.012) (0.027) (0.026)
Fixed-Rate Mortgage 0.027 0.035 0.010 0.014 0.023 0.038
(0.028) (0.029) (0.016) (0.017) (0.043) (0.043)
Initial Interest Rate 0.022 0.025 0.007 0.008 0.021 0.009
(0.016) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009) (0.021) (0.020)
Low-Doc Loan (DV) 0.027 0.011 0.009 – 0.001 0.014 0.003
(0.032) (0.034) (0.018) (0.019) (0.045) (0.044)
Loan-to-Value Ratio 0.095 0.084 0.537***
(0.096) (0.054) (0.162)
Debt-to-Income Ratio 0.002 0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Control variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.272 0.278 0.249 0.259
F-test of H0: All coeﬃcients p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
are equal to zero.
N 321 293 321 293 317 291
Notes: Regression coeﬃcients are reported in columns (1) - (4). Marginal eﬀects from probit models are
reported in columns (5) - (6). Robust standard errors in parentheses in columns (1) - (4). All speciﬁcations
contain the full set of control variables as in Table 7.
Level of signiﬁcance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
4
6Table 10
Controlling for Previous Homeownership Experience
Fraction of Fraction of Foreclosure
Time in Payments Initiated (=1)
Delinquency Missed
Numerical Ability Index – 0.049*** – 0.030*** – 0.075***
(0.019) (0.010) (0.028)
Number of prev. mortgages 0.001 0.005 0.019
(0.009) (0.005) (0.014)
First home purchase (DV) 0.046 0.023 0.089**
(0.031) (0.017) (0.043)
Shopped around before getting mortgage (DV) 0.029 0.017 0.017
(0.029) (0.016) (0.040)
Sought counseling for home buyers (DV) – 0.026 – 0.003 – 0.068
(0.050) (0.029) (0.053)
Attended home owner classes (DV) – 0.009 – 0.010 0.127
(0.047) (0.024) (0.102)
Control variables? Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.270 0.255
F-test of H0: All coeﬃcients p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
are equal to zero.
N 322 322 318
Notes: Regression coeﬃcients are reported in columns (1) and (2). Marginal eﬀects from
probit models are reported in column (3). Robust standard errors in parentheses in columns
(1) and (2). All speciﬁcations contain the full set of control variables as in Table 7.
Level of signiﬁcance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
47Table 11
Including Town, Servicer, and Originator Fixed Eﬀects
Fraction of Time in Delinquency Fraction of Payments Missed Foreclosure Initiated (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Numerical Ability Index – 0.081** – 0.055*** – 0.044*** – 0.045** – 0.037*** – 0.026*** – 0.105* – 0.106*** – 0.065**
(0.033) (0.020) (0.015) (0.022) (0.011) (0.009) (0.056) (0.032) (0.025)
Town Fixed Eﬀects? Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No
Originator Eﬀects? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Servicer Eﬀects? No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Control Variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.735 0.361 0.350 0.690 0.358 0.337 0.668 0.318 0.298
F-test of H0: All coeﬃcients p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
are equal to zero
N 319 307 293 319 307 293 319 307 293
Notes: Regression coeﬃcients are reported in columns (1) - (6). Marginal eﬀects from probit models are reported in columns (7) - (9). Robust
standard errors in parentheses in columns (1) - (6). All speciﬁcations contain the full set of control variables as in Table 7.
Level of signiﬁcance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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49Table A1: The Baseline Result in Tobit Models
Fraction of Time Fraction of
in Delinquency Payments Missed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Numerical Ability Index – 0.063*** – 0.067*** – 0.035*** – 0.041***
(0.023) (0.026) (0.013) (0.015)
Fluency in English 0.004 0.007
(0.021) (0.012)
Born in USA (DV) – 0.042 – 0.018
(0.115) (0.067)
Years lived in US 0.007 0.004
(0.005) (0.003)
Asian (DV) – 0.556** – 0.334**
(0.227) (0.133)
African American (DV) 0.140*** 0.090***
(0.049) (0.028)
Hispanic (DV) 0.050 0.036
(0.078) (0.045)
Native American (DV) – 0.046 – 0.033
(0.128) (0.074)
Other Ethnicity (DV) 0.103 0.088
(0.141) (0.081)
Age – 0.006 – 0.003
(0.005) (0.003)
Some High School (DV) – 0.154 – 0.074
(0.132) (0.076)
High School Degree (DV) – 0.138 – 0.060
(0.111) (0.065)
Some College (DV) – 0.055 – 0.016
(0.107) (0.062)
College Degree (DV) 0.028 0.023
(0.110) (0.064)
Professional Degree (DV) 0.030 0.017
(0.116) (0.067)
Number of Children 0.014 0.007
(0.014) (0.008)
Male (DV) 0.070* 0.046*
(0.041) (0.024)
50Table A1: (continued)
Fraction of Time Fraction of
in Delinquency Payments Missed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimated δ – 0.350 – 0.346
(0.951) (0.551)
Present-Biased (DV) 0.036 0.027
(0.050) (0.029)
Risk preference 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Log household income – 0.067* – 0.030
(0.038) (0.022)
Volatility of HH Income 0.059** 0.036**
(0.024) (0.014)
# of times out of work 0.016 0.007
in last ﬁve years (0.012) (0.007)
Employed (DV) 0.018 0.017
(0.054) (0.031)
FICO Score / 10 – 0.023*** – 0.013***
(0.003) (0.002)
Home Purchase (DV) – 0.067 – 0.025
(0.054) (0.031)
Months since home purchased – 0.001* – 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
Originated in 2007 (DV) – 0.063 – 0.027
(0.048) (0.028)
Investor (DV) 0.014 0.012
(0.098) (0.056)
Constant 0.249*** 2.022** 0.137*** 1.186**
(0.056) (0.987) (0.032) (0.572)
σ 0.350*** 0.294*** 0.201*** 0.170***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.011) (0.009)
N 339 322 339 322
Notes: Coeﬃcients of tobit models. Robust standard errors in columns (1) - (4). σ is the estimated
standard deviation of the residual.
51Level of signiﬁcance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
52Table A2
Dummy Variables of NA Categories Instead of Linear Term
Fraction of Time Fraction of Payments Foreclosure Initiated (=1)
in Delinquency Missed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NA Index = 2 (DV) – 0.025 – 0.037 – 0.031 – 0.040 0.020 – 0.016
(0.042) (0.042) (0.027) (0.027) (0.058) (0.054)
NA Index = 3 (DV) – 0.070 – 0.108** – 0.033 – 0.056 – 0.050 – 0.084*
(0.050) (0.053) (0.033) (0.035) (0.065) (0.048)
NA Index = 4 (DV) – 0.125*** – 0.142** – 0.084*** – 0.104*** – 0.142*** – 0.145***
(0.048) (0.060) (0.029) (0.034) (0.052) (0.032)
Control variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Test: all coeﬃcients p = 0.01 p = 0.04 p < 0.01 p = 0.01 p = 0.07 p = 0.02
of NA are zero
F-Test: Relationship p = 0.86 p = 0.81 p = 0.6 p = 0.7 p = 0.28 p = 0.31
is linear
R2 0.024 0.261 0.026 0.247
N 339 322 339 322 339 318
Notes: Regression coeﬃcients are reported in columns (1) - (4). Marginal eﬀects from probit models are
reported in columns (5) - (6). Robust standard errors in parentheses in columns (1) - (4). All speciﬁcations
contain the full set of control variables as in Table 7.
Level of signiﬁcance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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